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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 23,2012, attorney Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies") filed two 
separate petitions seeking judicial review of decisions made by the Board of 
Commissioners for Fremont County ("the Commissioners" or "the County").! (R. 
8-14). These petitions were filed on behalf of two separate groups of petitioners 
(referred to collectively as the "Petitions"): 
A. Case No. CV -12-S80 was filed on behalf of 
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Clen 
Atchley, Emma Atchley, Laura Pickard, Clay 
Pickard, George Ty Nedrow, and David Tuk 
Nedrow (collectively referred to as "Flying 'A' 
Ranch"); and 
B. Case No. CV-12-S81 was filed on behalf ofE.C. 
Gwaltney, III and Lana K. Vamey (collectively 
referred to as "Gwaltney"). 
Both Petitions named Fremont County and two of the County Commissioners 
(Ronald "Skip" Hurt and Leroy Miller) in both their official and individual 
capacities. Lewies defeated the incumbent Fremont County prosecutor in the 
primary election on May IS, 2012, and then ran unopposed in the general election. 
At the time of filing, Lewies was the prosecutor-elect for Fremont County, having 
! Lewies filed two separate petitions for judicial review: Petition for Judicial 
Review (November 23,2012) (CV-12-S80); and Petition for Judicial Review 
(November 23,2012) (CV-12-S81). Only the Petition for Judicial Review for 
CV-12-S80 is included in the record. (See R. 8-14). 
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been duly elected in the general election held November 6,201 Lewies had not 
yet taken office when he filed the petitions; he was sworn-in on January 14,2013. 
On January 2, 2013, the County, through its then deputy prosecuting 
attorney, at the insistence of the County Commissioners, set a hearing for a 
motion to disqualify Lewies from representing the Petitioners and the County in 
these matters. On January 7,2013, the County filed a motion to disqualify and 
requested attorney fees. A motion for partial dismissal was likewise filed seeking 
to dismiss each of the named County Commissioners in their individual 
capacities. In response to the motion to disqualify, Lewies filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel for Petitioners later that day. Lewies filed an affidavit 
acknowledging, "a conflict of interest will arise in connection with my continued 
representation of Petitioners in this case." (R. 31)? While recognizing the 
inherent conflict of interest in representing the Petitioners, Lewies did not 
withdraw his claim to represent the County on these matters. 
On January 11, 2013, the County filed a substitution of counsel, advising 
the district court that the County had retained the law firm of Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker, P.A to defend it in aforementioned Petitioners for Judicial Review given 
the inherent conflict of interest Lewies had from his prior representation of 
2 At oral argument Lewies conceded that he had forgotten to withdraw and was 
reminded of this obligation upon the County's filing of the motion to disqualify. 
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Petitioners. On January 14,2013, Lewies and Lynn Hossner ("Hossner") 
stipulated to the substitution of Hossner for Lewies in representing Flying "A" 
Ranch. (R. 42-43). Hossner continues to represent Flying "A" Ranch in the 
proceedings. 
Oral argument took place on January 22,2013 on the County's motion to 
disqualifY and Le~1es' motion to withdraw. A motion for partial dismissal of the 
two County Commissioners individually named was also taken up at the hearing. 
The Court dismissed the individually named Commissioners. The district court 
has previously summarized that hearing as follows: 
The Court noted that Mr. Lewies had failed to withdraw voluntarily 
until the County had filed its motion to disqualifY him. It also 
questioned the wisdom and ethics of filing actions against an entity 
he had just recently been elected to represent on behalf of clients 
he could no longer represent. Mr. Lewies attributed the delay to an 
oversight and argued that no rule of professional conduct was 
violated. He claimed that his clients were operating under time 
constraints due to the statute of limitations. He agreed that he 
should no longer represent his former clients or the County on 
these matters in the future. 
(R. 104-107). Mr. Lewies questioned the authority of Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, 
P.A. to file any motions or argue on behalf of the County. At the oral argument, 
counsel for the County noted that he was an acting deputy prosecutor for the 
County when the motions were filed and that his firm was now acting under a 
contract with the County Commissioners. The district court took care to 
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emphasize that Lewies' actions had essentially deprived the County of legal 
counsel in this matter. Lewies contended, under objection, however, that his 
newly appointed deputy prosecutor, Billie Siddoway, could take over Lewies' 
representation of the County on these discrete matters. 
At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the Court barred Lewies from 
representing either his former clients (Petitioners) or his new client (the County) 
in the identified matters, thereby effectively granting both the motion to disqualify 
and the motion to withdraw. The Court further concluded: 
... the County is entitled to recover its attorney fees incurred in 
filing the motion to withdraw. Any fees will be awarded against 
Mr. Lewies personally, but not against his clients, the Petitioners. 
Mr. Hall may file a request for fees with appropriate supporting 
documents within 14 days. Mr. Lewies will be allowed to appear 
for purposes of contesting the attorney fees only. 
(R. 106). The Court further permitted Lewies' newly appointed deputy, Billie 
Siddoway ("Siddoway"), 14 days to file a brief explaining why the Fremont 
County Prosecutor's Office should be allowed to continue representing the County 
on these matters, rather than an attorney of the Commissioners' choosing. (R 
106). 
Consistent with the district court's order, Siddoway filed a Notice of 
Conflict of Interest on February 6, 2013. (R 71-73). Siddoway was "terminated" 
by Lewies four days later for filing the Notice of Conflict of Interest against his 
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wishes, despite Lewies being barred from representation of either Petitioners or 
the County. (R. 100-103). Lewies then appointed Ryan Dustin ("Dustin") to 
serve as his deputy prosecutor on February 11, 2013. Lewies then filed a motion 
for extension of time, under objection from the County, for briefing the issue of 
Lewies' deputy prosecuting attorney being permitted to represent the County. A 
hearing on the motion was held on February 15, 2013. At the hearing, the district 
court granted the extension on the express condition that both Lewies and Dustin 
visit with counsel from the Idaho State Bar ("Bar Counsel") about the ethical 
ramifications of Lewies conduct in these matters. Shortly after the hearing, Dustin 
filed a notice with the district court that his office was withdrawing from 
representation of the County on the two petitions. (R. 145-149). 
The County subsequently filed a timely affidavit of attorney's fees and 
Lewies filed an objection. Oral argument took place on February 26,2013. The 
district court subsequently issued its Memorandum Decision re: Sanctions 
("Memorandum Decision") on March 29, 2013. The district court ruled that 
Lewies had violated rule 11 (a)(1), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure and that Fremont 
County was entitled to an attorney fee award in the amount of $1,185.00 against 
Lewies personally. The instant appeal was subsequently filed by Lewies. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Rule 11 Sanctions are Left to the Sound Discretion of the Court 
Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 can only be used where a filing 
violates the signature requirements ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure II(a)(1). 
However, Lewies' reading of Rule 11(a)(1) is misplaced and fails to consider the 
Idaho Supreme Court's express language allowing Rule 11 to be awarded as a 
sanction for "misguided filings" and "litigative misconduct." 
Rule 11, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 
one (1) licensed attorney of record of the state of 
Idaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose 
address shall be stated before the same may be filed. 
A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state 
the party's address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings 
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or party has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of 
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
6 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention 
of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or 
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, "[t]he intent ofthe rule is to grant 
courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete pleading abuses or other 
types of litigative misconduct." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 650, 115 
P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). Rule 11 is appropriately used as a 
"management tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish and deter 
specific frivolous and other misguided mings." Lester v. Salvino, 141 Idaho 
937,940, 120 P.3d 755, 758 (et. App. 2005) (citing Campbell v. Kildew, 141 
Idaho 640, 650, 115 P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (emphasis added). A Rule 11 sanction 
is appropriately imposed where the district court is considering only the 
"attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers." Riggins 
v. Smith, 126 Idaho 10 17, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). Thus, Idaho law is 
clear that Rule 11 is not simply limited to sanction an attorney who signs a 
frivolous or unmeritorious pleading. Rather, Rule 11 can permissively be used to 
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sanction an attorney for "litigative misconduct" or for the filing of "misguided 
filings." 
Initially, Judge Moeller, recognized that the imposition of sanctions was 
subject to an abuse of discretion standard. (R. 185). Specifically, the district 
court recognized that it acted within its discretion where it "considers whether it 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and 
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." See Lamar Corp. v. City 
o/Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40, 981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999). (R.185). 
Accordingly, where Judge Moeller recognized the issue of Rule 11 sanctions as 
discretionary, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and reached a decision 
through the exercise of reason, the Rule 11 sanction against Lewies should be 
upheld. In this case, it is clear from the plain language of the Memorandum 
Decision, and discussed more fully below, that Judge Moeller did not abuse his 
discretion when imposing Rule 11 sanctions. 
The Memorandum Decision meticulously addresses the procedural history 
that precipitated the lower courts decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Guiding 
the lower court's reasoning behind imposing sanctions on Lewies was the well-
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established Idaho law that Rule 11 may be used as a management tool to 
addressed litigative misconduct and misguided filings. 
Lewies focuses on seven phrases from the Memorandum Decision3, that 
were taken out of context and fail to consider the court's reasoning in toto. A 
reading of the Memorandum Decision where Lewies pulls his specific quotes was 
crafted with the "totality of the circumstances" of the litigation in mind. (R. 187). 
While the Court noted his concerns about Lewies conduct, he unequivocally 
stated in reference to his comments on the advisability of filing the petitions, 
"such matters are not questions typically answered by this court." (R. 187). 
Rather, as the court clearly recognized, its sanctioning authority was reviewed 
"pursuant to its 'court management' role and act using its inherent discretion to 
ensure that the adjudication is fair to all sides." (R. 187). 
The court further recognized that ethical rules were not a consideration in 
sanctioning Lewies, and the court viewed Lewies conduct in the broad picture of 
the "integrity of the judicial process." (R. 188). It was with this consideration 
that the district court found that the integrity of the judicial process (litigative 
misconduct) was harmed by Lewies failure to identifY the significant conflict 
issues that would inevitable be created by Lewies' filings: 
3 The seven quotes focused on are specifically identified in Appellant's Brief 
between pages 16 and 19. 
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The Court finds that regardless of the ethical 
ramifications, Lewies' filings of the petitions 
against a known, future client was a significant 
offense against the integrity of the judicial system. 
Fremont County voters were entitled to expect that 
the person they had just elected as County 
prosecutor would not be filing new legal actions 
against the County on behalf of private individuals. 
Similarly, the Commissioners had every reason to 
be concerned when they were sued in both their 
official and personal capacities by the incoming 
county attorney. By so doing, Lewies initiated a 
chain of events that any reasonable attorney should 
have anticipated would create mistrust and 
animosity from everyone involved-greatly 
undermining public confidence in the outcome of 
both cases. 
(R. 18 8 (emphasis in original)). 
Ultimately, the district court correctly concluded "Lewies' decision to sign and 
file the petitions was clearly misguided and adversely affected the integrity of the 
judicial process." (R. 188). The district court again noted that it was its duty to 
"safeguard the integrity of the judicial process" and was the very "type of 
litigative misconduct Rule 11 was intended to rectifY." (R. 188). The district 
court continued, "Lewies should have known at the time of filing the petitions that 
he would be unable [sic] to see either case through to completion-this is 
undisputed. Even if the Petitioners were acting under time constraints, that does 
not justifY Lewies acting in an ethically questionable manner." (R. 188). As such, 
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the district court appropriately recognized that the filing of the Petitions would 
instantaneously cause problems for both the Petitioners and the County. The 
district court was further concerned with Lewies failure to timely file a motion to 
withdraw that would have allowed the Petitioners to have immediate 
representation as the matter progressed through the appeals process. Further, any 
suggestion by Lewies that he completed his representation of Petitioners is devoid 
of verifiable facts in the record. It is merely supposition and reliance on Lewies 
representations only that the full representation was limited to filing the Petitions. 
Rather, the fact that immediate withdrawal was not performed at least causes a 
question about the actual scope of representation and Lewies ability to 
appropriately represent the petitioners. 
The district court at the January 22,2013 hearing specifically addressed 
his concern for the ramifications Lewies conduct would have on the County: 
I don't think Mr. Hall should have had to file a 
Motion in January of 20 13 to bring this issue to the 
Court's attention. I think this should have been 
brought to the Court's attention earlier by Mr. 
Lewies himself and even if the Court were to find 
that the questionable decision to file this after the 
election wasn't inappropriate, even if I were to 
agree with Mr. Lewies on that, certainly the Petition 
should have been followed with an immediate 
substitution of counsel indicating the new attorneys 
for the Petitioners were appearing. This puts the 
County in unfair jeopardy and uncertainty, it put the 
11 
Petitioners in a certain level of jeopardy, as well as 
there was uncertainty about their future 
representation. Now, granted, this didn't occur 
during a critical phase of these proceedings because 
we're still preparing the transcript and the record, 
but nevertheless, there are strategic decisions that 
are made in cases like this that require someone to 
have counsel that can act without conflict and I 
think Mr. Lewies' actions put everybody in a certain 
degree of jeopardy. I certainly think Mr. Hall was 
justified in bringing his Motion when he did in the 
manner that which you did. 
(Tr. 23:13-24:11). 
Lewies' reading of Rule 1 I is overly simplistic and ignores the explicit 
requirement that an attorney who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an 
improper purpose. The lower court explicitly detailed the improper purpose and 
appropriately employed its power to manage its docket. The district court's 
decision and the underlying rationale for imposing Rule 11 sanctions was within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and reached through an exercise of reason. 
As such, this Court should uphold the district courts imposition of sanctions 
against Lewies. 
B. Lewies Disputed Hall's Continued Representation of the County 
Which Unnecessarily Prolonged This Litigation and the Cost to the County. 
Lewies contends that the Court abused its discretion by suggesting that 
Lewies "initially refused to withdraw as counsel for the County." Lewies' 
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contention is taken out of context and clearly designed to misstate the district 
courts understanding of Lewies' representation in the Petitions. In fact, it is clear 
from the January 22,2013 hearing transcript that Lewies did not believe the 
County Commissioners had made the necessary findings to hire Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker to represent the County on the Petitions. Lewies specifically stated on the 
record that he did not believe Nelson Hall Parry Tucker should represent the 
County: 
Well, Your Honor, I'd like to note for the record 
that I don't believe Mr. Hall is properly here 
representing Fremont County because the Idaho 
Constitution required the County Commissioners 
make a public finding of necessity before retaining 
their own private counsel. 
I've reviewed the Minutes of the County 
Commissioners. I've had my Deputy, Billie 
Siddoway, review the Minutes of the County 
Commissioners and we find no finding of 
necessity-
(Tr. 16: 13-22 (emphasis added)). At the hearing, Lewies continued to maintain 
that his office could represent the County and he was involved in crafting this 
argument. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that Lewies' continued instance on who could 
properly represent the County caused a delay in this matter. As a result of Lewies' 
position, additional briefing was necessary and further hearings were required. 
13 
procedural argument pursued by Lewies undoubtedly caused a delay 
in the adjudication of the Petitions. As the court noted at the January 22,2013 
hearing, "Now, granted, this didn't occur during a critical phase of these 
proceedings because we're still preparing the transcript and the record, but 
nevertheless, there are strategic decisions that are made in cases like this that 
require someone to have counsel that can act without conflict and I think Mr. 
Lewies' actions put everybody in a certain degree of jeopardy." (Tr. 24:2-9). 
There were legitimate concerns that invariably caused the district court concern 
about who would be representing the County and this had a delay on the 
proceedings---especially because the briefing schedule had to be adjusted. (R. 
142-143). 
To suggest that the district court did not understand Lewies' role in 
representing the County is a liberal restatement of the procedural history in this 
matter. Moreover, as discussed more fully above, the district court clearly 
understood Lewies' role and the significant difficulties imposed both on the 
respondents and the County. It is clear from the record that the district court 
understood Lewies' role and there was no abuse of his discretion in its findings. 
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C. Lewies Has Waived Any Argument Challenging the County Retaining 
Private Legal Counsel. 
Lewies continues to argue that the County could not retain private legal 
counsel. Lewies does not have standing to pursue this issue and further, the 
Fremont County Deputy Prosecutors Siddoway and Dustin both confirmed that 
there was no continued challenge by their office ofthe County's retaining Nelson 
Hall Parry Tucker as private legal counsel in defending against the Petitions. 
It is unclear what Lewies is attempting to argue because his own office has 
previously conceded that they would be withdrawing this issue. Once directed by 
the district court to provide information on whether Lewies' office could represent 
the County given the circumstances of the Petitions, Siddoway filed a Notice of 
Conflict of Interest on February 6, 2013, stating: 
I respectfully submit this notice in response to the 
Court's request for briefing of January 22,2013. A 
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 of the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct prevents me from 
taking a position adverse to the decision of the 
Fremont County Commission to retain outside 
counsel in this matter. I have provided legal advice 
to the Fremont County Commission on the matter of 
retaining outside counsel and, while I do not 
represent the County in this matter, I consider the 
County to be a "current client" as that term is used 
in Rule 1.7. 
15 
(R. 72). Subsequently, following a motion to extend the briefing schedule filed by 
Lewies' office, on February 19,2013, Lewies' office filed a Notice of Withdrawal 
of Motion to Represent Fremont County. (R. 145-149). The Fremont County 
Prosecutor's office unequivocally stated with regard to representation of the 
County as follows: "Upon further review of all aspects of the unique facts peculiar 
to this particular situation and for the considerations states, the Fremont County 
Prosecutor's Office withdraws its motion to represent Fremont County in these 
petitions for judicial review." (R. 149). 
Lewies has waived any argument that outside legal counsel's continued 
representation of the County is inappropriate. In fact, the Court's comment that 
"deem [ ed] it appropriate" for the County to have retained private legal counsel is 
consistent with the filings by the Fremont County Prosecutor's Office. Finally, 
the Memorandum Decision was filed well after Lewies' office conceded it could 
not represent the County on the Petitions. Accordingly, any argument on outside 
legal counsel's continued representation is irrelevant, moot, and has been waived 
by Lewies. 
16 
D. There Is No Evidence Of Bias Or Prejudice By Judge Moeller. 
1. Lewies Has Waived Any Argument of Bias By Failing to File a 
Motion to Disqualify. 
Lewies' suggestion that Judge Moeller was biased and/or prejudiced 
against Lewies has been waived because Lewies did not file a motion to disqualify 
Judge Moeller pursuant to Rule 40( d)(2), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure. 
Specifically, Rule 40(d)(2)(A) states that "any party to an action may disqualify a 
judge or magistrate for cause from presiding in any action upon any of the 
following grounds: ... 4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced 
for or against any party or the case in the action." (Emphasis added). Had Lewies 
legitimately believed Judge Moeller was biased or prejudiced against him, his 
appropriate remedy was to file a Motion for Disqualification for Cause. Lewies 
did not pursue this remedy and any claims are now waived. 
2. The Ex Parte Communication was Appropriate and Does Not 
Exhibit Bias or Prejudice. 
Lewies alleges Judge Moeller was biased and/or prejudiced against him 
for two reasons (1) there was an ex parte communication, and (2) the award of 
Rule 11 sanctions was awarded sua sponte. However, neither argument is 
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supported by competent evidence in the record to support Lewies' claim of bias or 
prejudice. 
Lewies argues that the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(B)(7) 
was violated by Judge Moeller when an ex parte communication occurred in 
chambers following the January 22,2013 hearing.4 Cannon 3(8)(7) states in 
relevant part as follows: 
A judge shall accord to every person who has a 
legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's 
lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A 
judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications 
made to the judge outside the presence of the parties 
concerning a pending or impending proceeding 
except that: 
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte 
communications for scheduling, administrative 
purposes or emergencies that do not deal with 
substantive matters or issues on the merits are 
authorized; provided the judge reasonably 
believes that no party will gain a procedural or 
tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte 
communication. 
LC.J.C, Cannon 3(8)(7)(a) (emphasis added). 
4 Of note, the County was unaware that there was ever any ex parte 
communication until a passing comment was made at the February 26,2013 
hearing. The district court further addressed the communication in his written 
Memorandum Decision. 
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Lewies summarizes his recollection of the communication that occurred 
on January 22,2013 following the hearing. However, it is clear from the record 
and Lewies' affidavit that the ex parte communication did not involve any 
substantive issues. Lewies suggests, despite no evidence to support this 
statement, that Judge Moeller stated that Lewies had "to decide what hill you want 
to die on." (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). However, the affidavit of Lewies describes 
the interaction quite differently, "following the court hearing on these matters held 
January 22, 2013, District Judge Gregory Moeller, invited me into his chambers 
and told me he was aware of the ongoing bitter personal disputes among my 
predecessor-in-office, Joette Lookabaugh and her deputy prosecutor, Blake Hall, 
and myself. Judge Moeller advised me that everyone would be better off if the 
disputes ended." (R. 65-66). 
In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Moeller took exception to Lewies' 
description of the communication: 
The Court disagrees with Lewies' account of the 
conversation that took place after the hearing on 
January 22,2013, because he appears to imply the 
Court was critical of the County Commissioners and 
Hall. While the Court acknowledges that it briefly 
met with Lewies in chambers following the January 
22, 2013 hearing, the Court merely advised him to 
avoid allowing a political grudge to interfere 
with his professional judgment. The merits of 
the cases were not discussed. The Court initiated 
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this conversation after consulting Idaho Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(D), which provides, 
in part: "Judges are encouraged to bring 
instances of unprofessional conduct by judges or 
lawyers to their attention in order to provide 
them opportunities to correct their errors 
without disciplinary proceedings; ... " 
(R. 189, th. 14 (emphasis added)). The district court did not violate Cannon 
3(B)(7) because there was no discussion of substantive issues. Furthermore, the 
communication was specifically initiated for a proper purpose, to highlight 
potential unprofessional conduct and allow Lewies to correct his errors. 
Additionally, as noted by Judge Moeller, the conversation did not address 
substantive issues of the Petitions, and in fact, substitute counsel was involved by 
that time representing the petitioners interests. Thus, the merits of the cases are 
being dually considered by the district court without consideration of Lewies' 
involvement in the adjudication of the Petitions. In sum, the conversation was 
appropriate and covered an issue that was appropriate, within the bounds of a 
judge's role, and had no bearing on the adjudication ofthe Petitions. 
Accordingly, there was no bias or prejudice exhibited by the ex parte 
communication on January 22,2013. 
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3. The District Court's Rule 11 Sanction Did Not Demonstrate 
Bias or Prejudice. 
Lewies suggests that Judge Moeller exhibited bias or prejudice because the 
court sua sponte awarded fees pursuant to Rule 11, Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 11 specifically permits a sua sponte award under the Rule: "[i]f a 
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ... " LR.C.P. ] l(a)(1) 
(emphasis added). Thus, a sua sponte award is not inappropriate. 
The district court further explained its rationale in awarding fees as a 
sanction pursuant to Rule 11 in the Memorandum Decision. The district court 
explained it's reasoning as follows: 
At the conclusion ofthe January 22,2013 hearing, 
the Court invited the County to submit an affidavit 
setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in 
seeking Lewies' disqualification. Although much 
of the oral argument and briefing has since focused 
on a prevailing party analysis under LR.C.P. 54(e) 
and I.e. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that 
such an effort is misplaced. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has made clear that "[t]he reasons for which 
attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to I.e. § 12-
121 and LR.C.P. 54(e)(I) are not reasons that will 
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
11(a)(I)." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho 
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Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 96, 803 P.2d 993, 1002 
(1991 ). 
Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court 
appears to more closely fall under the provisions of 
Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 186). The Court did state in a footnote, however, that "[i]n the event LR.C.P. 
54( e) and 1. C. § 12-121 were controlling, the Court notes that the record would 
support findings that the County was the prevailing party and that both petitions 
were brought and pursued unreasonably." (R. 186, fn. 11). The district court 
clearly articulated the rationale for awarding fees pursuant to Rule 11, also noting 
that an analysis under Rule 54( e) and § 12-121 would also lead to the same result. 
Ultimately, Lewies' argument of bias and/or prejUdice is premised entirely 
on supposition and a very liberal account of the procedural history of this matter. 
Lewies takes numerous statements out of context in an effort to argue bias. This 
tactic is improper and ignores the factual record before this Court. There is no 
evidence that the award of Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte was improper or the 
result of bias or prejudice. The district court acted appropriately and within its 
discretion. 
E. There Was No Unethical Or Improper Conduct By Mr. Hall 
Lewies inappropriately suggests that Mr. Hall somehow engaged in 
improper or unethical conduct by not reaching out to Lewies before filing the 
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motion for disqualification. tactic appeaers to be a continued attempt by 
Lewies to impugn Mr. Hall and further distract the Court from Lewies improper 
conduct that warranted sanctions. Lewie~ improperly suggests there were three 
violations by Hall regarding his representation of the County: (1) failure to contact 
Lewies prior to filing the Motion for Disqualification; (2) improperly discussing 
continued representation of the County on the Petitions; and (3) claiming an 
hourly rate of $225 per hour for work. Each of these allegations is baseless and 
unsupported by the record before the Court. 
1. There Was No Requirement to Notify Lewies of the Motion 
For Disqualification Prior to Filing. 
Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 requires a telephone call to 
opposing counsel prior to filing a motion. Absent in Rule 11 is any language 
suggesting that an attorney is required to contact another attorney before filing a 
motion. Rather, the plain language of Rule 11 states "that to the best of the 
signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ... " LR.C.P. II(a)(1). The 
only requirement is that the motion be grounded in fact and that the signing 
attorney has made an inquiry that the facts support the motion. In this case, the 
facts unequivocally support the filing of the Motion for Disqualification. (R. 18-
23 
22). This fact is evidenced both by the filing by Lewies seeking withdrawal from 
the case (R. 30-33) and the district courts position that the County had acted 
appropriately. Specifically, the district court stated at the January 22,2013 
hearing, "I don't think Mr. Hall should have had to file a Motion in January of 
2013 to bring this issue to the Court's attention .... 1 certainly think Mr. Hall was 
justified in bringing his Motion when he did in the manner that which you did." 
(Tr. 23:13-24:11). In its written Memorandum Decision, the district court 
specifically stated "the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the County 
to remind him [Lewies] of his legal and ethical duties before filing the motion for 
disqualification. There is no requirement in Rule 11 to contact opposing counsel 
prior to filing and the Court implicitly found that the filing was appropriate and in 
all likelihood "may have actually prevented Lewies from suffering the ethical 
consequences of failing to withdraw sooner." (R. 189). 
2. The County Appropriately Hired Nelson Hall Parry Tucker. 
Lewies argues that Hall was precluded from continuing to work for the 
County once the County recognized Lewies would inevitably have a conflict of 
interest in further representation of the County on the Petitions. Lewies argues 
that Rule 1.11 (d)(2)(ii), Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, was somehow 
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violated by the County requesting that Hall continue to represent the County 
defending against the Petition. Rule 1.11 (d) states as follows: 
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently 
serving as a public officer or employee: 
(l) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and 
(2) shall not: 
(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated 
personally and substantially while in private practice or 
nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate government 
agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or 
(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who 
is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which 
the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that 
a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative 
officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as 
permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in 
Rule 1.12(b). 
I.R.P .C. 1.11 (d). Rule 1.11 (d) is specifically designed to ensure that a lawyer 
does not seek employment where from a party where confidential or other 
information may be obtained. This is specifically noted from the importance 
placed on Rules 1.7 (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients) and 1.9 (Duties to 
Former Clients). A lawyer owes both current and former clients certain 
obligations of confidentiality and Rule 1.11 is intended to ensure a lawyer does 
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not abuse those obligations. The comments to Rule 1.11 further reiterate the 
intent of Rule 1.11: 
The Rule represents a balancing of interests. ON one hand, where 
the successive clients are a government agency and another client, 
public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in 
that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. 
A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other 
client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional 
functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage 
could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential 
government information about the client's adversary obtainable 
only through the lawyer's government service. On the other hand, 
the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a 
government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit 
transfer of employment to and from the government. 
LR.P. C. 1.11, Cmt. 4. It is clear that there was nothing improper with the County, 
recognizing the inherent conflict of interest with Lewies, would seek alternative 
representation of HalL The County recognized that Hall had knowledge of the 
proceedings and was in the best position to advocate for their interests. Rule 1.11 
does not address a current governmental employee continuing representation of 
the governmental entity in a private capacity. It is simply a continued 
representation of the governmental on the same matters and no special benefits or 
advantages would be provided to the County. To suggest that there was any 
violation of Rule 1.11 is patently false and inconsistent with the clear intent of 
Rule 1.11. 
26 
3. There Were No False Statements Made To The District Court. 
Lewies erroneously suggests that the rate of $225 was inappropriate. 
Lewies claims that the affidavit states that Hall's hourly rate was $225 per hour 
was somehow false because Hall agreed to represent the County at $150 per hour 
for his work as private legal counsel. These accusations are patently false and 
fails to recognize that Hall was a salaried employee at the time the motion for 
disqualification was made. Further, Hall specifically stated his position on the 
sanction of Lewies: 
... quite frankly, I don't have any skin in this fight. If you award 
attorney's fees, it doesn't go to Blake Hall, it goes to the County. 
The reason I say I don't have any skin in this fight is I get paid 
either way. It's the County-I have not been harmed, it is the 
County that has been harmed by the circumstances that we're 
dealing with and so I just don't want anyone to come across or feel 
that there's something personal in this fashion on this issue, 
because certainly from my vantage point there never been anything 
personal and Ijust don't take the practice personally. 
(Tr. 45: 1 0-21). Hall clearly articulated that he had no personal animosity towards 
Lewies and that any attorney fee award would go directly to the County. 
When the affidavit of costs and fees was prepared, the law requires that a 
reasonable attorney fee be used. Mr. Hall's normal and customary hourly rate at 
the time was $225 per hour for private work. This is an accurate and truthful 
statement of Hall's hourly rate and were "reasonable and similar to, or less than, 
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those charged by attorneys with comparable experience and expertise in the 
vicinity of Fremont County, Idaho. (R. 52). Lewies reference to the $150 per 
hour billable rate was an unrelated contractual agreement between the County and 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A. for legal work to be performed once Lewies took 
office. At the time the motion for disqualification was prepared, Mr. Hall was 
still a salaried employee of the County and was not operating under the agreement 
for $150 per hour. As is customary, an attorney is entitled to agree to a lesser 
hourly rate than his customary hourly rate. It is important to note, however, that 
the district court did lower the rate from $225 to $150 per hour in calculating the 
final attorney fee award. However, in this case, the work performed related to the 
preparation and filing ofthe Motion for Disqualification was accurate reflection of 
Hall's billing rate. The contracted rate really had not bearing on the rate for which 
work was performed while employed by the County. Thus, there is not evidence 
of any false statements being made by Hall. 
Ultimately, Lewies has frivolously and improperly raised these issues 
regarding Mr. Hall in an effort to assail Mr. Hall's character. This issue has never 
been raised by Lewies in any pleading and no hearing was ever held on this matter 
either. The County has never really had the ability to address Lewies erroneous 
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statements. Lewies conduct is inappropriate and should not be condoned by this 
Court 
F. The County Is Entitled To Attorneys' Fees on Appeal 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, the County seeks an award of 
attorney fees in accordance with Idaho Code Section 12-117. Section 12-117 
provides for a municipality to recover attorney fees when "the party against whom 
the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Under 
the statutes, the County is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without 
foundation. 
Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to 
make a legitimate showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Bowles v. Pro 
Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). In this case, there is no 
legitimate argument that the trial court misapplied the law. Lewies simply takes 
numerous statements out of context to suggest that the Rule 11 sanction was 
inappropriate. Lewies' arguments fail to consider the plain standard of abuse of 
discretion and the totality of the Memorandum Decision that clearly articulates the 
basis for the Rule 11 sanction. As a result of Lewies frivolous and unwarranted 
filing, the County has been forced to expend significant costs and fees in 
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defendant against Lewies questionable conduct Accordingly, the County requests 
an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that the Idaho 
Supreme Court find that the district court appropriately acted within the bounds of 
its discretion and exercised reason when it sanctioned Mr. Lewies. The 
Respondents respectfully request that this Court find that the sanction in the 
amount of$1,185.00 against Lewies personally was appropriate and that Lewies 
be required to pay said amount. These Respondents further request an award of 
costs and fees incurred in filing and arguing this appeal before this Honorable 
court. 
Dated this day of September, 2013. 
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